Elite Networks, Political Belief Formation and Government Performance: An agent-based approach to a general political economy equilibrium by Henning, Christian H.C.A. et al.
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
2010 Conference Proceedings
2010
Elite Networks, Political Belief Formation and
Government Performance: An agent-based
approach to a general political economy
equilibrium
Christian H.C.A. Henning
University of Kiel, chenning@ae.uni-kiel.de
Volker Saggau
University of Kiel, vsaggau@ae.uni-kiel.de
Johannes Hedtrich
University of Kiel, jhedtrich@ae.uni-kiel.de
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Conference Proceedings at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 by an
authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henning, Christian H.C.A.; Saggau, Volker; and Hedtrich, Johannes, "Elite Networks, Political Belief Formation and Government
Performance: An agent-based approach to a general political economy equilibrium" (2010). 2010. Paper 36.
http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2010/36
Elite Networks, Political Belief
Formation and Government
Performance:
An agent-based approach to a general political
economy equilibrium
Christian H.C.A. Henning, Volker Saggau
and Johannes Hedtrich, University of Kiel
This paper investigates the impact of the embeddedness of politicians in
a local elite network on government performance in decentralized and cen-
tralized political systems. Formal political decision-making among a set of
legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a mod-
ified non-cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron-Ferejohn type.
Legislators’ policy preferences are derived endogenously from political sup-
port maximization based on legislators’ beliefs how a rural development pol-
icy translates into the welfare of the agrarian and non-agrarian population.
Legislators are generally uncertain regarding the political technology, i.e. the
welfare changes induced by a policy. Accordingly, legislators communicate
with the local elite to learn more about the true political technology and
hence to undertake better informed political decisions. However, local elites
might be biased in favor of a specific population group, i.e. communication
might also bias political beliefs. A trade-off between more efficient policy
learning and an increased policy bias induced by an increased embeddedness
in local elite networks is identified. Policy bias is attenuated in centralized
when compared to decentralized systems, while vice versa the speed of pol-
icy learning through local elite networks is c.p. higher in decentralized when
compared to centralized systems. Moreover, within a constitutional system
elite network structures such as local size, clustering or centralization have
an impact on overall efficiency of political decsion-making.
1 Introduction
Although economic theory of politics or new political economy has underlined the inter-
connection between politics and the economy for a long time (Weber, 1921; Commons,
1931; Schneider et al., 1981; Miller, 1997), classical applied political economy models
assigned politics only a minor role and focused mainly on modeling the economic sector.
In contrast more recent approaches focus on modeling the political decision-making
process as an interaction between a set of individually rational political actors. Within
these new political economy approaches, biased policies result as specific incentive prob-
lems, where political institutions are considered as key factors influencing individual
incentives of political actors. Thus, in light of these new approaches, beyond economic
factors determining deadweight costs and demographic factors determining cost of inter-
est organization, formal political institutions are the main factors in explaining observed
variances of economic policies across countries (Persson and Tabellini, 2002).
For example, Persson and Tabellini or Milesi-Ferretti et al. nicely demonstrate how
the electorate system and the organization of legislature determine general macroeco-
nomic policies (Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2002). Although these
new approaches nicely explain the role of political institutions in determining policy
choice, they focus on modeling formal political institutions, while informal network re-
lations among governmental and non-governmental organizations have not been taken
into account, yet.
In contrast, the early studies of policy networks focused on social network structures
among governmental and non-governmental organizations to explain political decision-
making (Parsons, 1963) and (Coleman, 1963). In particular, Laumann and Knoke (1987)
and Knoke et al. (1996) have developed social influence models to explain opinion forma-
tion within a political communication process, where governmental actors partly adopt
their policy positions to the positions communicated by other non-governmental orga-
nizations. However, while early policy network studies relate network structures nicely
to the political influence of individual actors, these studies do neither provide a ratio-
nal model of political influence nor do they relate policy network structures to political
performance at the macro level. In this context this paper suggests a theoretical model
that provides a rationality for the social influence of non-governmental actors on the
political position of governmental agents and allows the relation of policy network struc-
tures with the efficiency of political decision-making at the macro level. In particular,
the rationality of political influence follows from the fact that from the viewpoint of
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political agents political decision-making is characterized by a fundamental uncertainty
regarding the impact of policies on the state of the world. Thus, while most politicians
have a clear preference regarding the desirable state of the world, they have only limited
and incomplete information on the political technology, i.e. how different policy instru-
ments actually translate into a specific state of the world. Accordingly, agents have to
choose among policy alternatives although they are uncertain regarding the evaluation
of different alternatives. But in a world of uncertainty it turns out that maximization
of individual utility can only be achieved by some supplement strategies. For example,
to be able to make a rational choice in these situations agents form beliefs regarding the
uncertain impact of various policy alternatives on the state of the world and thus on their
utility. Accordingly, we analyze in an agent-based model framework how political com-
munication network structures among a local elite influences information aggregation
via communication and hence overall efficiency of local government.
This research relates to the burgeoing literature focusing on the influence of social
network stuctures on economic and political behaviors including the formation of opin-
ions, decisions of which products to buy, investment in education, just to name a few
(see also Currarini et al. (2009)).
Moreover, the idea of social influence models to explain agent’s opinion formation has
been taken up by economists, e.g. models of herding behavior (Krause, 2004), where
Battiston et al. (2004) explicitly analyzed the role of social networks in agents’ opinion
formation and decision. Moreover, Bala and Goyal (1998) analyze belief formation
in a social network. However, they do not analyze how specific network structures
influence agents’ belief formation. Later Gale and Kariv (2003) as well as Choi et
al. (2004) or Celen et al. (2004) explore the interaction between network structures
and beliefs, but they focus their analysis on small networks (3 nodes) and have not
considered large and more complex networks. More recently Currarini et al. (2009)
analyzes in a very interesting theoretical paper the impact of communication network
structures among a set of actors on their opinion formation. However, although Currarini
et al. (2009) nicely analyzed how communication network structures influence the overall
efficiency of collective decision-making in the limit of infinitely large societies, they have
not yet analyzed how network structures affect efficiency of political decision-making
in real small societies. Moreover, Currarini et al. (2009) analyze the impact of network
structures on learning and efficiency of decision-making applying a rather abstract model,
while they do not provide a realistic model of how and why elite networks influence
political decision-making.
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In this regard this paper aims to contribute to closing this gap. In detail, it is demon-
strated that political communication among governmental and non-governmental actors
implies both a more efficient learning of the true political technology and a policy bias
towards particular interest of local community. Given a policy bias of local elite the
overall impact of communication on the efficiency of local government decision-making
depends on the network structures, i.e. random networks are c.p. more efficient when
compared to clustered or centralized communication network. Therefore, communi-
cation networks correspond to information aggregation mechanisms and hence can be
interpreted as social capital in the sense of Coleman or Burt, where concrete individual
and collective values of a communication network depend on its specific structure and
the interplay between informal network stuctures and formal political institutions. For
example, our simple simulation analyses imply a trade-off between more efficient policy
learning and an increased policy bias induced by an increased embeddedness in local elite
networks. Interestingly, this policy bias is attenuated in centralized when compared to
decentralized systems, while vice-versa the speed of policy learning through local elite
networks is c.p. higher in decentralized when compared to centralized systems. More-
over, within a constitutional system elite network structures such as centralization have
a signficant impact on overall efficiency of political decision-making, while for local size
and clustering only a minor impact results.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on information and political decision-
making, e.g. the very interesting work of Ball (1995), Krehbiel (1991) and Lohmann
(1994) as well as the classical jury theorem formulated by Condorcet.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 a description of the
theoretical model is provided. In section 3 the simulation set-up is described, while key
results of the simulation analyzes are discussed in section 4.2. Section ?? includes a
critical discussion of the potential contribution of the suggested approach and a brief
outlook on future research.
2 The theoretical model
2.1 Background and motivation
The basic structure of the political economy equilibrium model corresponds to an eco-
nomic and a political decision-making model. Political agents are interested in maximiz-
ing their level of political support. In doing so, the political support, S, depends on the
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state of the economic system, z: S = S(z). In turn, the state of the economic system
depends on the policy, (α): T (z, α) = 0. Policy preferences of the political representa-
tives U(α) are the result of the maximization of political support S(z) restricted by the
political technology T (z, α) (Rausser and Freebairn, 1974; Zusman, 1976).
Accordingly, political economy equilibrium models simultaneously include an economic
equilibrium model T (z, α), relating exogenous policy instruments (α) with relevant state
variables of the economic system, z, as well as a legislative decision-making model deriv-
ing policy choice, α, endogenously from legislator’s policy preferences, u(α) and given
formal constitutional rules, e.g. α∗ = Γ [u(α)].
While T (z, α) corresponds to the true political technology Γ [u(α)] corresponds to a
formal legislative decision-making model. Although political economy equilibrium has
been fully characterized at theoretical level, applied political economy models existing
in the literature have not yet even come close to being able to model both levels simul-
taneously.
In contrast, classical economic analysis of policy intervention focuses on modeling
the impact of exogenous policy on the state of the economy using a specific functional
form of T (z, α) (Tinbergen, 1956), while in political science formal models of legislative
decision-making focus on the analysis of policy choice under various constitutional rules
based on a specific form of Γ [u(α)].
An integration of these two approaches to a general political economy equilibrium
model results when legislators’ policy preferences, u(α), entering into the legislative
decision-making model are endogenously derived from political support maximization:
u (α) = Max {S(z) |T (z, α) ≡ 0}
Empirically the political technology is often modelled applying an economic partial
or general equilibrium model. However, for almost all policies neither economists nor
politicians know the true political technology and there hardly exists consensus regard-
ing the true political technology. Accordingly, politicans form prior beliefs regarding
the political technology. Given prior beliefs observed policy outcomes are informative
regarding the true political technology, thus comparing observed and expected policy
outcome politicians can learn about the true political technology and up-date their be-
liefs accordingly. However, individually observed policy outcomes are often noisy, which
restricts an effective observational learning of indidiviual agents.
Taking the complexity of belief up-dating via communication in networks into account,
a fully rational learning becomes infeasible (Golub and Jackson, 2009). However, as
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Golub and Jackson (2009) pointed out it is nonethelss possible that agents using fairly
simple updating rules will arrive at outcomes like those achived through fully rational
learning.
Accordingly, we propose an agent-based model of the belief formation in communi-
cation networks, which in contrast to standard economic approaches and in line with
sociological approaches only assumes bounded rationality of agents applying partly rules
of thumb to cope with the complexity of their decision problem. In particular, our model
corresponds to rational agents as it derives agents’ decision from expected utility maxi-
mization. However, to cope with fundamental uncertainty agents form beliefs applying
more simple heuristics or rules of thumb to cope with complexity.
Further, as will be shown in detail below belief up-dating via communication in elite
networks involves a trade-off between a higher efficiency of political learning and a policy
bias resulting from biased policy preferences of non-governmental elite members. Thus,
when compared to political decison-making without political communication the overall
impact on political performance, i.e. efficiency of political decision-making, depends on
both elite network structures, policy bias of governmental and non-governmental elite
members and formal constitutional rules.
Our complete political economy model includes three stages: 1) agents’ belief forma-
tion via political communication in networks, 2) derivation of agents’ policy preferences
based on political beliefs, and 3) final political decision-making as the result of legislative
bargaining determined by agents’ policy preferences and given constitutional rules.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Legislative bargaining
Following Baron and Ferejohn (1989), we consider a legislature comprising of a set N of
n legislators, where l = 1, ..., n denotes the index of legislator l, and a constitutionally
fixed majority voting rule ϕ. Legislature has to choose collectively a policy α out of a
compact and convex subset Rm of the m-dimensional cube (0, 1)m. Each legislator l ∈ N
has a complete, transitive binary preference relation defined for all α, α′ ∈ Rm, that is
represented by a concave utility function Ul(α). Formally, the rule ϕ corresponds to
a binary choice procedure, which determines legislature choice among two alternatives
α and α′, and a random recognition rule that determines which legislator can make a
proposal.
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In general, the random recognition rule can be represented by a vector of individual
probabilities q = q1, .., qnL , where ql denotes the probability that legislator l is chosen to
make a proposal. For simplicity we assume in the following that ql = 1/n for all l ∈ N .
The choice procedure can be represented by a set of winning coalitions, G. A winning
coalition g ∈ G is defined as an element of the superset 2N , for which the following
holds: if all members of g vote for an alternative α in comparison to an alternative α′,
then legislature chooses the alternative α.
If s denotes the status-quo policy, a necessary condition for a change of the status-
quo policy is the existence of a winning coalition g whose members uniquely prefer an
alternative to the status quo SQ. Let W (SQ) ⊆ Rm denote the subset of alternatives
α, for which a winning coalition exists that prefers α to SQ. A general characteristic
of legislative decision-making is that W(s) is generally a large subset of Rm and there
exists a large number of different winning coalitions preferring different alternatives to
the status quo. Moreover, constitutional rules neither determine which winning coalition
has to form nor which element of W(SQ) has to be proposed.
In this context Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model legislature’s choice of a policy α ∈ Rm
as an infinite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game among legislators determined
by the following rules. At a first stage an individual legislator, l ∈ NL, is selected
according to the randomized recognition rule to propose a policy, and at a second stage
all legislators vote on the made proposal. If the proposed policy received sufficient
votes, i.e., a winning coalition forms for the proposal, this proposal is the new policy.
Otherwise a new legislator is selected and the procedure starts from the beginning.
Assuming individual preferences are common knowledge, Baron and Ferejohn (1989);
Banks and Duggan (1998) have shown that the non-cooperative bargaining game has
a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even for multidimensional policies and
multiple legislators, i.e., m,n > 1.
Given the limited mental capacities of human beings, it is quite obvious that legis-
lators could not perfectly know spatial preferences of all other legislators in a multi-
dimensional policy space. In contrast, to deal with imperfect information, legislators
simplify real world phenomena, i.e., apply low-dimensional ideological spaces to approx-
imate legislators true preferences. Based on the ideological approximation of the true
policy space, legislators are able to anticipate other legislators’ response to policy pro-
posals. Of course, since information is imperfect, this anticipation is also imperfect; i.e.,
legislators can only estimate the probability that other legislators will agree with their
proposal.
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To include imperfect knowledge of other legislators’ preferences, we suggest a modified
legislative bargaining game via relaxing the assumption of noise free perfect rational
behavior of legislators (Henning, 2005; Henning et al., 2008).
In particular, we assume that voting on a policy proposal at the second stage of the
game is probabilistic rather than deterministic; i.e., legislators do not always "best re-
spond" according to their expected utilities since there is some noise in their choices.
This noise can be due to errors in terms of perception biases, distractions, or miscalcu-
lations that lead to non-optimal decisions, or it can be due to unobserved utility shocks
that make rational behavior look noisy to an outside observer. Regardless of the source
of the noise, choice becomes stochastic, and the distribution of the random variables de-
termine the form of the choice probabilities. Following the interesting work of McKelvey
and Palfrey (1998, 1995), a quantal response equilibrium can be defined as a vector of
individual response probabilities that is a stochastic best response to itself (Goeree and
Holt, 2005).
To simplify derivation of our model, we assume for the moment that legislators’ pro-
posals are exogenously determined; that is, whenever a legislator k is selected according
to the random recognition rule, he will suggest his proposal xk.
To formalize the probabilistic behavior, we follow Goeree and Holt (2005). Thus,
assuming probabilistic voting, the total utility of legislator l received from a vote in
favor or not in favor of the proposal xk, is received by adding a stochastic utility term
ξωi to the spatial utility, where ξ > 0 is an error parameter and ωi represent identically
and independently distributed realizations of a random variable for the decision to vote
for the party platform, i = 1, or against it, i = 2. Total utility to vote for the proposal
is greater than total utility from voting against it if it holds:
U(xk) + ξω1 > δWl + ξω2.
ξ is a parameter determining the level of agents’ rationality; the larger ξ the more
agents’ voting behavior becomes stochastic and independent of agents’ policy prefer-
ences. Assuming a double exponential distribution for ω results in the following choice
probability (Goeree and Holt, 2005):
pilk =
eξU(xk)
eξU(xk) + eξδWl (1)
Of course, legislators always vote for their own proposal, i.e.:
pikk = 1 ∀k
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Further, let Wl denote the continuation value of a legislator l playing the modified
infinite horizon non-cooperative legislative bargaining game, and let Πgk denote the
probability that the winning coalition g is formed to support the proposal xk while Πk
denotes the probability that the proposal xk is accepted, then it follows:
Πgk =
∏
l∈g
pilk
∏
l′ /∈g
(1− pil′k)
Πk =
∑
g∈G
Πgk
(2)
Given the definition above and let δ denote the common discount factor of legislators,
the continuation value of the infinite legislative bargaining game is defined as follows:
Wl =
∑
p
qpΠpUl(xp) + δWl
∑
p
qp(1− Πp)
⇔
Wl =
∑
k′
qk′Πk′
1−δ+δ
∑
k′
qk′Πk′
∑
k
qkΠk∑
k′
qk′Πk′
Ul(xk)
(3)
Finally, if we denote the vector of probabilities that legislators vote for a party proposal
k by pik = {pi1k, ..., pink} and define the vector pi = {pi1, ...pik, ..., pin} , then, given the
exposition above, it follows that pi is defined as a function of itself: pi = h(pi).
Accordingly, we define pi∗ as a fix point of h. Then pi∗ can be considered as a (sta-
tionary) quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of the game as it is the best stochastic
response to itself in every bargaining period.
So far we have assumed that legislators’ proposals are exogenously given. However, in
real legislative bargaining, this is obviously not the case. A contrario when formulating
a proposal, legislators try to formulate a policy that guarantees the support of a winning
coalition while maximizing legislators’ own policy preferences.
Accordingly, define pi∗(x) as the QRE implied by the proposal vector x, then the
formulation of a policy proposal corresponds to the following expected utility maximiza-
tion:
x∗k = Maxxk C(xk, x−k) Uk(xk)
,where x−k denotes the vector of legislators’ proposals without the proposal of legislator
k.
Thus, assuming a simple Nash equilibrium for legislators’ endogenous proposal for-
mulation, an overall equilibrium for the modified non-cooperative legislative bargaining
game can be stated as in Proposition 1 :
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Proposition 1: A vector of policy proposals, x∗, and a vector of legislators’ choice proba-
bilities, pi∗, correspond to an equilibrium of the modified infinite legislative session game
with endogenous proposal formulation if the following condition hold: (a) pi∗ is a QRE
for the given proposal vector x∗, i.e it holds: pi∗ = h(pi∗, x∗), and b) it holds for all x∗k:
x∗k = Maxxk C(xk, x
∗
−k) Uk(xk)
Moreover, in equilibrium the expected policy outcome corresponds to a weighted mean
of legislator’s ideal points, E(z) = ∑
k
C∗kx
∗
k, where the weight of a legislator k corresponds
to the ex ante probability that its platform will be the final policy outcome. In particular,
it holds:
C∗k =
qkΠk(pi∗, x∗)∑
p
qpΠp(pi∗, x∗))
(4)
The proof of proposition 1 follows directly from Goeree and Holt (2005) and, therefore,
is omitted here.
2.2.1.1 Cooperative legislative bargaining
Note that given the noise of legislators’ choices at the voting stages as well as due to
the random recognition rule, policy outcome is uncertain ex ante. Therefore, as long as
it is assumed that legislators are risk averse, policy outcome is inefficient; i.e., certain
policy outcomes, which are commonly preferred by all legislators, always exist. Thus,
legislators have incentives to agree on informal decision making procedures if these infor-
mal procedures lead ex ante to more efficient outcome. Weingast (1979) was one of the
first scholars who emphasized the role of self-enforcing informal procedures in legislative
decision-making. Based on Weingast, Henning (2000) suggests a mean voter decision
rule as a self-enforcing informal procedure of legislative decision-making derived in the
shadow of the uncertain outcome of non-cooperative legislative bargaining. According to
the mean voter decision rule, legislature directly formulate a common proposal, which
corresponds to the weighted mean of legislator’s policy proposals, where the weights
of individual proposals equal legislators’ ex ante probabilities that their proposals will
10
be the final outcome of the formal non-cooperative decision making procedure. Thus,
formally the mean voter decision rule is defined as:
αm =
∑
k
Ckx
k (5)
Given the concavity of legislators’ utility functions, it follows directly that the mean
voter decision rule implies for every legislator a higher ex ante expected utility when
compared to the non-cooperative outcome of the modified Baron-Ferejohn legislative
bargaining game.1 Hence, the mean voter decision rule is self-enforcing.2
Note, that although applying the mean voter decision rule leads to policy outcomes
that are ex ante Pareto dominant vis-a-vis the non-cooperative legislative bargaining,
a wining coalition of legislators might have an incentive to deviate from this procedure.
That is applying the mean voter decision rule is a "legislative norm" that only becomes
self-enforcing if legislators do not discount future gains from cooperation too much.
Finally, please note that another advantage of our cooperative legislative bargaining
model when compared to the Baron-Ferejohn model is that it can be directly applied
empirically to real political systems including multiple heterogeneous actors and multi-
dimensional policy decisions.
Finnally, assuming perfect uncertainty regarding the prefercnes of other legislators
implies that for any proposal xk the expected propability that other legislators will vote
in favor of this proposal equals 0.5. Under this assumption the mean voter decision rule
simplifies as follows (Henning (2008):
αm =
∑
g
CgY
g (6)
with:
Cg =
ng∑
k
nk
(7)
,where ng is the number of winning coalitions of which agent g is a member and Y g
denotes the prefered policy position of agent g.
1Note that even in the original BF-model assuming perfect knowledge of legislators’ preferences policy
outcome is ex ante inefficient from legislators’ point of view due to legislators’ uncertainty to be a
member of the winning coalition.
2In a more general version, it can also be considered that the process of legislative decision making
includes always finite sessions ex post; i.e., it is possible that no proposal will be accepted and thus,
the status quo remains as the final policy outcome (Henning, 2004).
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Furthermore, it holds for Y g:
Y g = argmaxUg(α) (8)
2.3 Political belief formation
As explained above indidivual politicians do not know the true political technology and
hence have to form beliefs to make a rational policy decisions.
To illustrate how naive policy learning in political communication networks works let
E denote the set of elite members, where the set N of political agents is a subset of the
E. Beyond political agents a subset of non-governmental actors, e.g. representatives of
stakeholders which by constitution are not involved in legislative decision-making. We
denote i, j ∈ E a generic element of the political elite.
Further, we assume for simplicty in the following that the true political technology is
linear, i.e. the matrix A denotes the true political technology, i.e. z = Aα.
Let A˜i denote a simple linear political technology believed by a elite member, then
her policy preferences u(α) result from the following support maximization:
ui(α) = Max
{
Si(z)| z = A˜iα
}
Assume further actors observe policy outcomes implied by a policy α, z(α). Obviously,
these observations are informative regarding the true poltical technology. However,
individual observations are noisy, e.g.:
zbi = Aα + εi
,where εi denotes an ideosyncratic error term, with E(εi) = 0.
Accordingly, elite members can up-date their political beliefs based on the comparison
of observed (zb) and expected (ze) policy outcomes. Assuming a Nerlove belief formation
of indiviudal actors, it follows:
A˜t+1 = A˜t + β
[
dz
dαt
]
(9)
with:
dz = zb − ze =
[
dz
dαt
]
α
12
The parameter 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 denotes the adaptive-expectation coeficient. The matrix[
dz
dαt
]
needs to be further specified. For a concrete example please see below.
Given the fact that individual observations are noisy, agents are only imperfectly
informed about the true political technology A.
In contrast, even if individual signals are noisy, in the aggregate the total set of agents
is generally well-informed, since it observes a number of independent draws of the signal
zb = Aα + εi.
To see this note that Nerlove belief up-date results for each actor an error, δ regarding
his estimation of the true political technology:
a˜i = a+ δi (10)
Please note that ’a’ and ’a˜’ are vector representations of the matrices A and A˜, where
all row vectors are simply connected to a long row vector. Accordingly, δg is a vector
of errors for each component of A. Obviously, δ is a stochastic variable, where each
indiviudal error δi is a realization of this stochastic variable. To facilitate our expositions
on naive learning we assume in the following that the expectation value of δ is zero.
Under this assumption a naive updating rule taking simply the average of all individual
beliefs, a = ∑
i
ai results in the limit in the true poltical technology and for a finite number
of actors it results c.p. in a lower error when compared to an individual belief update.
However, no single agent observes all signals. Therefore, agents are interested in a
collective communication process, where agents communicate their received signals.
An optimal communication process would correspond to a super-agent who aggregates
privately received signals of all agents and communicates aggregated signals back to all
individual agents. But, in reality agents’ ability to communicate their experience may
very well be limited.
In particular, actors might not communicate the true signals they have observed, but
rather their opinion regarding the optimal policy. Let Yi denote policy prefered by an
actor i, then it holds:
Yi = argmax
α
Si(z) s.t. z = A˜iα (11)
However, as long as the communicated opinion is based on agents’ private experience,
it might still be informative to other agents.
To see this we further assume for the moment that all agents have the same initial
beliefs and the same adaptive-expectation coeficient. Thus, under this assumption it fol-
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lows quite plainly that agents’ prefered policy positions (yi) are symetrically distributed
arround the optimal policy α∗ 3
Obviously, as long as the set of agents is sufficiently large applying a naive belief-
updating procedure, where agents simply from their final policy position as the average
of all policy positions communicated by other agents, leads to an aggregation of decentral
information and hence to a more efficient learning when comprared to individual up-
dating without communication.
However, communication is normally more structured and restricted, e.g. agents com-
municate directly only with a small subset of the total population. In this context ?
have proven in a very interesting paper how specific communication structures relate to
overall efficiency of belief up-dating in a limit society applying the DeGroot model. In
contrast to ? we analyze how communication network structures within a finite political
elite influence efficiency of political decision-making given different central and decentral
legislative constitutions. Moreover, also we apply a similar naive learning process our
model differs from the DeGroot model.
To consider communication structures we define a binary network T 1, where T 1ij = 1
indicates that agent i and agent j have an established communication tie. Accordingly,
we define the subset Ei =
{
i ∈ E, T 1ij = 1
}
as the neighborhood of agent i, where it
holds:
∑
j∈Ei
tij = 1 tij =
T 1ij∑
j′∈Ei
T 1ij′
Accordingly, T = [tij] denotes the communication network, where tij > 0 indicates
that actor i pays attention to actor j. T is a stochastic matrix, i.e. for each actor the
sum of total weights equals 1.
Within one period a political communication process occurs, where elite members
repeatedly update their political opinion via taking weigthed averages of their neighbors’
beliefs with tij being the weight or trust that actor i places on the current belief of agent
j in forming his or her belief for the next period (see also ?. Let r = 1, .., R denote the
communication round than it follows:
Y r+1i = tiiY 0i +
∑
j 6=i
tijY
r
j (12)
3Form eq.11 follows that yi is a function of the true political technology, a, and the error δ. Thus,
applying a first order Taylor approximization at the point δ = 0 results that the expectation value
of yi equals α∗.
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Moreover, the initial belief Y 0j just follows from actor’s belief regarding the political
technology:
Y oj = argmax
α
Sj(z) s.t. z = A˜jα (13)
Rewriting equation 13 results:
Y r+1i = tiiY 0i + (1− tii) ·
∑
j tˆijY
r
j
with : tˆij = tij(1−tii)
(14)
where Y ri is the opinion of agent i resulting after r communication rounds, and Y 0i
denotes agent i’s initial opinion before communication.
Actors form their intital opinion via Nerlove up-dating after they have received the
private signals. The parameter tii represents the weight for their own opinion. As T
is row normalized to one, (1 − tii) is the aggregated weight for all neighbors, i.e. the
influence or communication field of other agents.
Writing eq. (14) in matrix notation results after further rearrangements:
y =
[
I − (1− tdiag) Tˆ
]−1 · tdiag · y0 (15)
with M =
[
I − (1− wdiag) Cˆ
]−1
tdiag being the network multiplier which is similar to
the Hubbell index (Hubbell, 1965).
Please note that the belief up-dating in eq. 15 is similiar, but still differs from the
DeGroot model analyzed by ?. In particular, note that for any row stochastic matrix
Tˆ belief formation converge to a well-defined limit y corresponding to the belief vector
of actors reached after communication. Accordingly, the limit opinion of each agent
after communication results as a weighted average of the initial opinion of all agents
before communication (y0), where the weight of agent j’s initial opinion (Y oj ) for agent
i’s opinion after communication (Yi) just equals the elementMij of the multiplier matrix
M . Thus, the multiplier defines the field strength of agent j’s initial opinion operating
on agent i’s final opinion. Note that the multiplier includes all communication loops
among actors, i.e. all direct and all indirect effects of j’s initial opinion on the opinion
of agent i resulting from communication.
Assuming for the moment an equal field strength for all agents, i.e. Mij = 1n for
all i, j ∈ E, implies that the opinion of all agents after communication just equals the
average initial opinion held before communication.
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Assuming further that elite members are homogenous regarding their political support
functions, the naive belief-updating procedure via communication leads to an aggrega-
tion of decentral information and hence to a more efficient learning when comprared to
individual up-dating without communication.
But in general agents are heterogenous which further biases communication among
agents. Thus, beyond observed signals agents’ political opinions might be determined
by other private characteristics, e.g. heterogeous individual support functions or prior
beliefs.
It is a well-known empirical fact that political elites are often dominated by special
interest groups which prefer biased policies in favor of particular economic interests at
the expense of the general public (Persson et al., 2003).
Hence, from the viewpoint of the society belief updating in elite networks implies
a trade-off between a more efficient policy learning and a policy bias towards special
interests.
Thus, the question is how this trade-off is affected by elite network structures and
the interplay between formal constitutional rules and informal elite network structures.
To analyze these questions we apply a rather simple agent-based model including both
political belief formation via political communication in elite networks and political
decision-making resulting from legislative bargaining. To facilitate analysis we assume
for the latter that cooperatve legislative bargaining can be modeled applying the mean
voter decision rules as derived in eq.6 above.
3 Simulation Setup
3.1 Economy and population
We consider two communities c = 1, 2. Each community has a population comprising
two groups, an agrarian and a non-agrarian population, where µc denotes the share
of the agrarian population in community c. In particular, we assume one community
corresponds to a rural, while the other correpsonds to an urban community, i.e. µ1 > 0.5
and µ2 < 0.5.
Furthermore, let Zc1 and Zc2 denote the per capita welfare of the agrarian and non-
agrarian population, respectively.
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3.2 Political System
3.2.1 Legislative System
The political system comprises of a set N of n = 20 legislators, where legislators can
be subdivided into the two communities c = 1, 2. For notational convenience legislators
l = 1, ..., 10 belong to the rural community c = 1, while legislators l = 11, ..., 20 belong to
urban community c = 2. For each community legislature has to choose an unidimensional
policy α ∈ R = (0, 1).
The policy α is considered as a redistribution of welfare among agrarian and non-
agrarian population, where the political technology A corresponds to the following simple
linear mapping:
Zcw = ac0w + ac1wα (16)
, where ac0w denotes the welfare of group w in community c without any policy.
In detail 2 different constitutional scenarios are analyzed. (1) A decentral system: i.e.
for each community a community council comprising the subset of legislators of each
community chooses separately the community policy according to a simple majority
role. (2) A central system: i.e. a joint council comprising the total set of legislators
chooses one policy that is applied for both communities according to a simple majority
role.
Accordingly, political control of legislators, Ccl over community policy,αc results as
follows:
For scenario s=1:
Cscl =
0.1 l ∈ Nc
0 otherwise
For scenario 2:
Cscl = 0.05 l ∈ N, c = 1, 2
The final political decision resulting from legislative bargaining corresponds to the
mean voter decision rule:
αs∗c =
∑
l∈N
CsclYcl (17)
, where Ycl denotes the ideal point of legislator l regarding the community policy αc.
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3.3 Derivation of legislators’ political preferences
Legislators care about community policy because they are reelected in communities. In
particular, we assume that rural legislators are reelected in the rural community, while
urban legislators are reelected in the urban community.
In principle reelection chances of individual legislators depend on realized welfare of
agrarian and non-agrarian population in their community. However, we assume that
individual legislators differ regarding their specific affiliation to the agrarian group in
their community. Thus, overall political support of individual legislators results from
the following Cobb-Douglas support function:
Sl =
∏
w,l∈C
ZXl1c Z
(1−Xl)
2c (18)
A legislator is biased in favor of the agrarian population if the weight of the welfare of
the agrarian population, Xl, is higher in his or her political support function than the
corresponding population share, muc, in his community.
Hence, since legislators form only beliefs regarding the political technology relevant
for their community, single-peaked policy preferences result from political support max-
imization given legislators’ beliefs of the true political technology, a˜ = [a˜cw1], with l ∈ c:
Ul(αc) = (a˜l01 + a˜l11)Xl(a˜l02 + a˜l12)(1−Xl) (19)
In particular, legislators ideal position results as:
Yl = Xl
a˜l02
a˜l12
+ (1−Xl) a˜
l
01
a˜l11
(20)
, where legislators’ ideal position is the same for both communities, i.e. it holds:
Ycl = Yl.
3.4 Political performance indicator
Based on legislators policy preferences legislative bargaining occurs in eqch time period
t = 1 and given the constitutional rules the final policy decisions results from the mean
voter decision rule:
αs∗c =
∑
l∈N
CsclY
o
cl (21)
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To measure political performance we apply a political loss function L(α) defined as
the euclidian difference between the actual policy decision αs∗c and the optimal policy
decision αoptc . The latter is defined as the policy that maximized a community welfare
function: Wc =
∏
w∈C
Zmuc1c Z
(1−µc)
2c :
L(α) =
∥∥∥αs∗c − αoptc ∥∥∥ (22)
Of course, the loss function can be evaluated for each time period or alternatively the
aggregate loss over all time periods can be calculated. We will use both performance
indicators to evaluate the impact of elite network strctrue on political perfomance in the
folowing simulation analyses.
3.5 Belief formation
Generally, legislators do not know the true political technology Ac = [acw1] for each
community, but we assume for simplicity that legislators know for their community the
welfare of groups without policy intervention, i.e. rural legislators l = 1, ..., 10 know a1w0
and urban legislators l = 11, .., 20 know a2w0.
Moreover, legislators form beliefs only regarding the true political technology param-
eters alw1 in their community.
In particluar, we assume that legislators’ initial beliefs regarding each single political
technology parameter, a˜lw1t=0 result as random draws from independent normal distri-
butions with the corresponding true political technology parameters, acw1 as expectation
values:
a˜l12t=0 = ac12 + ωl12
,where ωl12 is a realization of a stochastic error term that is normally distributed with
an expectation value equal to zero.
Based on their initial beliefs legislators form their policy preferences and legislative
bargaining occurs in time period t=1. Given the constitutional rules the final policy
decisions results from the mean voter decision rule:
αs∗c =
∑
l∈N
CsclY
o
cl (23)
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Community policies are implemented and changes of per capita welfare of groups are
realized as implied policy outcomes dz(αs∗c(i)t). The index c(i) denotes a mapping of an
actor i into his or her corresponding community.
The latter are observed by individual elite members, but individual observations are
noisy, e.g.:
dzbi = Adαs∗c(i)t + εi
,where εi denotes an ideosyncratic error term, with E(εi) = 0 and dαs∗c(i)t is the policy
change in period t when compared to the previous policy in period t-1.
Accordingly, elite members can up-date their political beliefs based on the comparison
of observed (dzb) and expected (dze) policy outcomes, with:
dzei = A˜dαs∗c(i)t
Assuming a Nerlove belief formation of indiviudal actors, it follows:
a˜i1wt+1 = a˜i1wt + β
[
dzwt
dαc(i)t
]
(24)
Based on the new policy beliefs, the process starts again in the next time period t+1.
3.5.1 Belief formation in elite networks
So far we have only considered individual belief up-dating of agents based on the obser-
vation of policy outcomes. Beyond observational learning based on private information
we additionally consider belief updating via political communication in elite networks.
To this end, individual actors derive their ideal position in each time period t from
political support maximization based on their actual policy beliefs:
Y olt = Xl
a˜l02
a˜l12t
+ (1−Xl) a˜
l
01
a˜l11t
(25)
Next the vector of final policy positions yt held after communication is calculated ap-
plying the network multiplier matrix M derived from the political comunication network
T using eq. 15 above:
yt = Myolt (26)
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The final policy decision is then derived applying the mean voter decision rule using
the final policy positions yt.
αs∗ct =
∑
l∈N
CsclYlt (27)
3.5.2 Generation of elite networks
To be able to analyze the impact of network structures on political belief formation and
performance we have systematically simulated information accumulation in various ran-
dom as well as small-world respectively hybrid networks. Networks have been generated
using the modified α-model of Watts (1999) 4. A central parameter of this network gen-
eration algorithm is α which determines global network characteristics, i.e. clustering
and characteristic path length. In particular, we investigated two basic networks types,
random and small-world networks which we also call ”branched” since the preference to
form a tie is driven by the same branch respectively the same ideology. The small-world
networks have been constructed by the modified α-model. In order to test the influence
of network structures, about 200 different network settings have been tested. For each
setting 20 networks were generated so that the variance could be covered. The details
will be explained in the technical description.
At first the parameter settings will be explained inasmuch as this is driving the struc-
ture of the networks. The structure of the networks will always be linked to the economic
performance were the indicator is the so called α-loss described above. The following
list displays the setting elements which are varied for changing the network structure:
1. Increasing the number of agents from n1 = 40 to n2 = 150 for both network types
where average number of ties k = 6
2. Varying the average number of ties: k = 1, ..., 15 where the self-control µ = 1.
Each performed for the four network types: n = 40 random, n = 40 branched,
n = 150 random, n = 150 branched
3. Varying the clustering by varying α (only for small-world networks). Each per-
formed for the four following combinations: k [µ = 1, (k = 6, n = 40), (k = 10, n =
40), (k = 6, n = 150), (k = 10, n = 150)]
4. Varying centralization by varying the number of ties for a central political agent
from centralk = 10, ..., 130 with µ = 1. Each performed for the following four
4The detailed algorithm is described in Henning and Saggau (2009)
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combinations: (n = 40, α = 1), (n = 40, α = 10), (n = 150, α = 1), (n = 150, α =
10)
5. Varying the self-control µ = 0.5, ..., 5 with (n = 40, α = 1), (n = 40, α = 10),
(n = 150, α = 1), (n = 150, α = 10)
The multiplier matrices have been calculated in Java. These multiplier matrices diplay
the influence of the actors on each other (Hubbell, 1965) and are derived by the network
structures. To measure the network structure and the performance of the network
indicators have been calculated and logged per setting and per iteration.
3.6 Simulated elite network scenarios
The simulation scenarios consist of the already mentioned parameter settings regarding
the network structure, i.e. the common model parameters, and also of bias scenarios.
The last term, the bias scenarios, is refered to the politically interesting combinations of
biased influence measured by the force of the complete elite network as well as for the
two separated governmental and non-governmental networks (for the definition of the
force see below). In particluar, both political agents and interest groups can be biased in
favro of a specific population group, agrarian and non-agrarian, respectively. We tested
all bias combinations, that is all variations of the separate forces.
• bias political agents +,-
• bias lobbying groups +,-
• bias both +,- and opposing
Thus the resulting scenario names are
set scenarios /
bias_no_no
bias_pa_pos
bias_pa_neg
bias_lb_pos
bias_lb_neg
bias_pos_pos
bias_neg_neg
bias_pos_neg
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bias_neg_pos
/;
This general political economic equilibrium was constructed with GAMS. Due to the
random nature of our model we repeated each simulation run for each network pa-
rameter constellation 20 times, which means that all reported variable values generally
correspond to the mean over 20 simulation runs: 1 run equals 9 scenarios * 20 network-
iterations * 20 model-iterations (different rng)
⇒ ∑networks ∗ run = ∑ ≈ 720, 000 times solved the model
⇒ indicators for comparison / "sorting"
⇒ rerun k.times each "scenario"
⇒ result indicators: avg µ =
∑
Y
k
/ var σ2 = (µ−Y )2
k
/ SE = σ√
k
for observed variable Y
The simulation scenarios contain in a log file the calculated averages, variances, stan-
dard deviations, standard errors, min, and max for all indicators and all iterations. The
log files were then used to produce TEX-Plots from the simulation results, i.e. the results
from GAMS were read by Java which wrote plots into a TEX-file.
3.7 Network types
In the emerging literature on ”networks and economics” different types of networks
characterized by specific network indicators have become very popular (Jackson, 2005),
i.e., random networks (Erdös and Renyi, 1959; Bollobás, 2001), small-world networks(see
Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Watts (1999)) , and scale-free networks (Watts, 1999).
Moreover, hybrid models to generate networks have been developed since purely random
graph models do not exhibit the clustering or degree distribution that match many
observed networks, while generated small-world networks do not exhibit observed degree
distribution and power law or scale free networks do not exhibit observed clustering
(Pennock et al., 2002; Kleinberg et al., 1999; Levene et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2000;
Cooper and A., 2003).
To construct elite networks of difefrent types a modified α-model of Watts (1999) is
applied, which can generate hybrid networks combining properties of scale-free, small-
world, and random networks. The model is described in detail in Henning and Saggau
(2009).
A specific property of a social network is clustering, this means the fact that the
likelihood of a connection among two firms is correlated with the existing connections
among firms. In detail, the higher the number of overlapping connections between a
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pair of firms, the higher the probability that these two will form a connection as well.
How exactly clustering occurs is a very interesting topic in itself. In the Watt’s α-model
clustering is basically determined by a single parameter, α, which can vary between 0
and infinity. The lower the values for α the more a network is clustered.
However, within our modified α-algorithm clustering also occurs via homophily, e.g.
agents with simliar characteristics like the same political ideology or a simliar spatial
location have a higher probability to form a tie.
Moreover, the modified α-algorithm allows the existence of stars keeping the idea of
clustering. In detail, we assume that only one star exists, and we vary the number of
ties this star forms (for detailed network generation mechanism see Henning and Saggau
(2009)).
3.8 Network indicators
3.8.1 Local and global network indicators
Given the fact that we are mainly interested in the impact of social network structures
on efficiency of political decision-making, the following global and local indicators are of
general interest:
Local network size
If we denote the number of ties an individual actor i forms by zi, then local network
size, z¯, is defined as the average number of ties of actors:
z¯ =
∑
i∈E
zi
n
(28)
Global centralization
Global centralization of a network measures the difference in individual network ties
(degrees). Accordingly, the larger the variance of individual degrees of actors, the larger
is c.p. the centralization. Let σ2 denote the variance of degrees in a network, then it
holds:
σ2 = 1
n
∑
i∈E
(zi − z¯)2 (29)
Thus, by definition, centralization is measured by the variance or standard deviation
of network degrees, σ2 or σ, respectively.
Clustering/transitivity
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Network clustering or transitivity is defined as the average density of the actor’s
neighborhood network. A neighborhood network Ei of an actor i ∈ E is defined as the
subset of actors j ∈ E which have a tie to i:
Ei = {j ∈ E |zij = 1} (30)
Now, given zi neighbors of an actor i, the density of the neighborhood network Ei is
defined as:
γi =
∑
k∈Ei
∑
j∈Ei
zkj
zi(zi − 1) (31)
Finally, the global clustering is defined as the average density of all neighborhood
networks:
γ = 1
n
∑
i∈E
γi (32)
3.8.2 Force F
If we denote N as the subset of political agents, Battiston et al. (2004) define the force
as the field strength operating on individual political agents, i.e.:
F = 1
n
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
tijDj (33)
, where Dj = Xj − µc(j) denotes the bias of an actor towards or against the agrarian
population. Dj > 0 denotes a bias in favor of the agrarian population, while Dj < 0
denotes a bias in favor of the non-agrarian population. But, the force as defined by
Battiston et al. (2004) only takes direct influence of communication into account, while
indirect effects are neglected. Accordingly, in the framework of our simple linear opinion
formation model a straightforward generalization of the force concept would be:
F = 1
n
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈E
MijDj (34)
Note that the generalized force varies between −1 and 1, where a force of 1 indicates
that political agents’ political opinions are totally biased in favor of the agrarian popu-
lation. Vice versa a force of -1 indicates that agents’ opinion is totally biased in favor
of the non-agrarian population.
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Moreover, we can separate the force FN operating in the subset of political agents N
and the force operating in the subset of non-governmental actors, FE−N :
FN =
1
n
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
MijDj (35)
FE−N =
1
n2
∑
i∈E−N
∑
j∈E−N
MijDj (36)
Separating the force for the political agents and the non-governmental elite members
implies four different policy bias scenarios, i.e. both subsets are biased towards the same
population group (agrarian or non-agrarian) or the subsets are biased towards different
subgroups.
4 Results
4.1 Trade-off between policy learning and government capture
As can be seen from figure 1 collective up-dating via political communication within
in a local elite has a significant impact on political performance. However, there is a
trade-off between a positive affect resulting form information aggregation via political
communication and a negative affect resulting from a policy bias. The stonger the
elite is biased in favor of a specific population group the more the positive effect on
policy learning in networks is compensated. If the bias within the elite network is above
a specific treshold the overall effect of political communication becomes increasingly
negative as induced community policies are increasingly biased towards special interests.
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Source: Own calculations
Figure 1: Trade-off between policy learning and government capture
Interestingly, comparing the impact of poltical communication within elite networks
in central and decentral systems policy learning is c.p. more efficient in a central when
compared to a decental system assuming communities are not too heterogenous (see
figure 2). The main reason for this observation follows from the fact that the overall
bias of the elites is c.p. lower in central wehn compared to decentral systems, because
local elite biases in rural and urban communities compensate each other. However, if
comunities become too heterogneous common policy formulated in a central political
system as a compromise between different local community elites differs extremely from
each corresponding ptimal community policies. Hence, if communities are sufficiently
heterogenous decentral systems imply a higher political performance, while central sys-
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tems are c.p. more efficient, when communities are relative homogenous and local elites
are biased towards different population groups.
Source: Own calculations
Figure 2: Trade-off between policy learning and government capture in cnetral and de-
central systems
4.1.1 Force and political performance
In general the impact of elite networks on political performance significantly varies with
the overall preference bias observed for a elite. This can be clearly seen from figure
below, where the policy lossis tabulated against the calculated force for different elite
networks.
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Figure 3: varying_k - n=150 Random - force - total alpha loss
−0.15−0.1− 5 · 10−20 5 · 10−2 0.1 0.15
0
5
10
force
to
ta
l
a
lp
h
a
lo
ss
bias_neg_neg
bias_lb_pos
bias_pa_neg
bias_neg_pos
bias_pos_neg
bias_pa_pos
bias_pos_pos
bias_lb_neg
bias_no_no
4.2 Network structure and performance
The influence of networks and the structure of networks on the economic performance
in terms of ”choosing the right policy” is shown in this section. The indicator αloss
is derived above and diplays the relationship between the optimal policy αopt and the
realized policy αt. The higher the value of αloss the less is the political performance
due to the fact, at least in the model, that politicians or interest groups are biased.
In the following subsections, several network indicators which are structure-determining
parameters will be analysed concerning their influence on the political performance of
the network.
4.2.1 Network structure and performance: random vs. small-world networks
(clustering)
In figure 4 none of both groups is biased hence we can investigate the impact of the
network types on the political performance. The higher the number of agents in the
network the less is the total loss this clearly supports the information aggregation func-
tion of networks. In the case of 150 agents there is also only little difference between
the network types whereas in the case of only 40 agents the difference increases with
increasing numbers of ties k.
29
Source: Own calculations
Figure 4: Impact of network type on political performance
The random network reaches a higher political performance compared to the small-
world network.
4.2.2 The influence of local network size k
The local network size k of the network is varied from 1 to 15, this means that the
average number of network ties will subsequently be increased from 1 to 15. The impact
on αloss, i.e. the economic performance, is displayed in figure 5.
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Figure 5: varying_k - n=150 Branched - k - total alpha loss
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The first result is that, if both groups are positively biased, there is no network effect
and the αloss relatively high. The second result is that, if one group is biased or contrarily
biased, the network type matters, that is the local network size k has an impact on the
economic performance.
Figure 6: varying_k - n=150 Branched - k - total alpha loss
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4.2.3 Centralization
The centralization has a significant impact on the political performance although it de-
pends on who is biased and who is not. If the interest groups are biased the political
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performance increases with increasing centralization due to the fact that the information
aggregation effect of the network and the power of the central political agent overcom-
pensates the lobby bias. Whereas if the political agent is biased the political performance
increases with increasing centralization. The influence of the unbiased lobby decreases.
In the case of counter bias with respect to the two groups the political performance first
increases, i.e. αloss decreases and afterwards decreases with increasing centralization.
There is a phase when the information aggregation of the network leads to increasing
political performance but there are two phases in which the bias decreases political
performance.
Figure 7: varying_centralization - n=150 alpha=10 - centralK - total alpha loss
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Figure 8: varying_centralization - n=150 alpha=10 - centralK - total alpha loss
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5 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of the embeddedness of politicians in a local elite
network on government performance in decentralized and centralized political systems.
Formal political decision-making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter
decision rule derived from a modified non-cooperative legislative bargaining game of a
Baron-Ferejohn type. Legislators’ policy preferences are derived endogenously from po-
litical support maximization based on legislators’ beliefs how a rural development policy
translates into the welfare of the agrarian and non-agrarian population. Legislators are
generally uncertain regarding the political technology, i.e. the welfare changes induced
by a policy. Accordingly, legislators communicate with the local elite to learn more about
the true political technology and hence to undertake better informed political decisions.
However, local elites might be biased in favor of a specific population group, i.e. com-
munication might also bias political beliefs. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of
formal political institutions and the structure of informal elite networks determining pol-
icy outcome. A trade-off between more efficient policy learning and an increased policy
bias induced by an increased embeddedness in local elite networks is identified. Policy
bias is attenuated in centralized when compared to decentralized systems, while vice
versa the speed of policy learning through local elite networks is c.p. higher in decen-
tralized when compared to centralized systems. Moreover, beyond the policy bias within
an elite towards special interests elite network structures such as network type, local size
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and centralization have an impact on overall efficiency of political decsion-making. In
particular, random networks imply c.p. a higher political performance
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